Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 76

Issue 1

Article 14

5-24-2019

A Few Thoughts on “If a Tree Falls in a Roadway . . . .”
David Eggert
Washington and Lee University School of Law, eggertd@wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
David Eggert, A Few Thoughts on “If a Tree Falls in a Roadway . . . .”, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 563
(2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol76/iss1/14
This Student Notes Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review
at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

A Few Thoughts on “If a Tree Falls in a
Roadway . . . .”
David S. Eggert*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................................................... 563
A. Natural versus Artificial ........................................... 565
B. The No Duty Rule ...................................................... 567
C. The Tri-partite Duties of a Landowner for Injuries
on the Land ................................................................ 567
D. The Rights/Obligations Distinction .......................... 568
II. Placing the Issue in the Constellation of Virginia Law . 569
III. The Arguments for Imposing a Duty on Road
Maintainers ...................................................................... 571
I. Introduction
I was interested, but dubious, when my student Ian
McElhaney came to me with his incipient Note idea to write about
trees. Devoting a semester to studying and writing about the
tort-law treatment of trees falling on Virginia roads seemed a
quixotic quest. It didn’t seem like one of the burning legal issues of
the day. Decidedly low-tech in an age where the internet and
related technologies—or hot-button political or social issues—are
all the rage. Nevertheless, Mr. McElhaney’s original idea has
taken root and flourished, and merits careful consideration.
As Mr. McElhaney carefully put his note together, it became
clear to me that this seemingly small issue condensed into one
focused pressure point a number of important issues—the
purposes of law, the appropriate place of courts in the
modernization of ancient legal principles, and the peculiar position
of the Commonwealth of Virginia in all of this. The Note also had
*
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the advantage of having arisen organically from Mr. McElhaney’s
own legal experience with the issue of liability for fallen trees.
The result is a real contribution to the development of Virginia
law on this issue—an issue well positioned to for Virginia Supreme
Court review in the next few years. The crux of Mr. McElhaney’s
note is to examine the current state of Virginia law on liability for
injuries caused by falling trees and to recommend that Virginia
adopt a common-sense rule that general responsibility for
maintaining a roadway encompasses a collateral duty to ensure
that the roadway is reasonably safe from falling trees. The Note
starts with the premise that the Virginia Supreme Court fairly
recently, in 2012, addressed the issue of falling-tree liability. In
Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC,1 the Court hewed to the traditional (but
increasingly antiquated) rule that a private landowner has no duty
to inspect his property for rotting or otherwise unsafe trees at risk
for falling on the roadway. A spirited dissent by now Chief Justice
Lemons would have embraced the modern approach of imposing at
least some sort of duty on such a landowner. In any event, both the
dissent and the majority noted that the majority’s refusal to budge
from the traditional rule insulating landowners presaged no
judgment on the separate issue of whether road maintainers might
sometimes be liable for injuries caused by falling trees. Mr.
McElhaney’s Note takes up that challenge and argues that
Virginia should adopt “road-maintainer negligence liability” for
injuries caused by falling trees.2 Along the way, he treats some
salient issues of sovereign immunity, since “road-maintainers”
tend to be government entities.
Because Mr. McElhaney’s excellent note itself thoroughly
canvasses the various potential approaches to liability for
falling- tree injury and the existing law, I will confine my brief
remarks to (1) the background legal context that got us to where
we are on falling-tree liability; (2) how this peculiar issue fits into
Virginia’s general approach to the law; and (3) some thoughts on
Mr. McElhaney’s reasoning and ultimate conclusions in urging
liability for road maintainers.
1. 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012).
2. Ian J. McElhaney, Note, If a Tree Falls in a Roadway, Is Anyone Liable?
Proposing the Duty of Reasonable Care for Virginia’s Road-Maintenance Entities,
76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (2019).
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Background of the Traditional Falling-Tree Rule

The traditional common law rule imposes no duty upon the
owner of land to inspect and maintain trees on his property to
protect those on the road from injury to person or property. This
traditional rule flows logically from several broader doctrines long
central to tort law. Yet all of these doctrines have—at least in most
jurisdictions—narrowed significantly in the last several decades.
The question is whether the immunity of private landowners
should narrow along with them. These various doctrines
undergirding the law against landowner tree-falling liability
include (1) the general notion that the law should not impose
liability for naturally-occurring events (what I will call the
“Natural-Versus-Artificial-Conditions” Doctrine); (2) the so-called
“No Duty” Rule, under which a person generally has no duty to
rescue another either from natural conditions or from the
negligence or other wrongdoing of a third party; (3) the general
doctrine that landowners owe diminished duties in tort to those on
their land (meaning that they were until recently largely exempt
from the general duty of reasonable care imposed under the
emerging law of negligence upon most human activity other than
“landowning”); and (4) the general view that property ownership
confers “rights” as against society, more than “responsibilities”
toward society. I will briefly discuss the background and
development of each of these doctrines in turn.
A. Natural versus Artificial
The traditional “no-liability-for-falling-trees rule” can be seen
as one manifestation of the general reluctance to hold individuals
accountable for natural events. For example, consider the so-called
“Act of God defense” for inability to perform a contract: a humble
individual cannot reasonably be held to account for what are
regarded as the vicissitudes of nature or the hand of God. As
applied to trees, the idea is that a landowner does nothing to
disturb the natural course of nature simply by owning land
containing trees. Thus, the landowner has no obligation to protect
others from the natural process of trees decaying, rotting, and
falling.
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The common law often distinguished between natural
conditions (as to which there was a lesser duty or no duty at all to
protect others) and so-called artificial (or manmade) conditions.
For example, the classic torts case of Rylands v. Fletcher3 imposed
liability upon a landowner for flooding a mineshaft—a manmade
structure—on his land and thus injuring an adjacent landowner’s
property. The case is a watershed in the development of strict
liability.
Lord
Cairns
relied
heavily
upon
the
Natural-Versus-Artificial-Conditions Doctrine:
The D might lawfully have used [the land] for any purpose in
which it might, in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of the
land, be used, and if, in what I may term the natural use of that
land, there had been any accumulation of water, and if, by the
operation of the laws of nature that accumulation of water had
passed off onto the Plaintiff’s land, the plaintiff could not have
complained that the result had taken place.”4

In other words, it is a plaintiff’s own job to protect himself against
natural processes; it isn’t his neighbor’s job to do it for him. On the
other hand, according to Lord Cairn’s if—as was the case in
Rylands—the defendants had “not stopped at the natural use of
their close [a fancy word for land]” and had instead used it for a
so-called “non-natural use” then the D did so “at his peril.”5
Another example of this natural/unnatural distinction is the
so-called “attractive nuisance” doctrine, which holds that certain
conditions on property that are attractive to children supersede the
normal trespasser-unfriendly rules for landowner liability
discussed below.6 This exception is said to apply only to artificial
conditions on the land—not to naturally occurring attractive
nuisances. Once again, the law gives the landowner a pass with
respect to what can be described as naturally occurring conditions:
accordingly, liability might hinge on whether a child dies in a
swimming pool (artificial—liability) as opposed to a native lake
(natural-no liability).

3. Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 LRE & I App. (HL) 330 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (UK).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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B. The No Duty Rule
One of the leading torts professors in the country—indeed one
of the leading legal polymaths of his generation—is Richard
Epstein of the University of Chicago. In his hornbook Torts,
Professor Epstein writes: “The basic rationale for this rule—by
which he means the no-liability-for-falling-trees rule—“stems from
the general proposition that individuals do not owe affirmative
duties of care to strangers.”7 Epstein, following his customary
law-and-economics approach, explains the traditional rule in
economic terms: “The economic logic behind this position seems
quite strong. Natural events come in all shapes and sizes. The costs
of predicting and controlling those events are quite high and the
gains from taking precautions are generally quite low.”8 In other
words, the traditional no-liability-for-trees rule is a sort of shadow
companion to the general no-duty rule—that we don’t generally
have a duty to come to the rescue of others. Importantly, Professor
Epstein—unlike the Virginia Supreme Court—uses the tree-rule
as a “limit” on the traditional no-duty rule. His hornbook embraces
the modern position that it does sometimes make economic sense
to impose a duty on landowners to take precautionary measures
for basic tree safety/integrity inspection. Specifically, he uses his
same trademarked law-and-economics approach to endorse the
emerging tendency of courts (in states other than Virginia) to
impose inspection duties upon landlords in well-trafficked or urban
locales. The idea is that the cost-benefit ration changes in densely
populated urban settings where tree falls are more likely to inflict
in jury: The traditional rule, by contrast, developed in an historical
context where most land was rural, where landowners owned vast
tracts of forest, and where it was impractical and inefficient to
impose expensive inspection and repair duties on landowners.
C. The Tri-partite Duties of a Landowner for Injuries on the Land
As every first-year torts student no doubt recalls, the
traditional common law was very slow to apply negligence
standard to landowners when persons were injured on the land.
7.
8.

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS (1999).
Id.
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Instead, something approaching the reasonable standard of care
was requires only with respect to business invitees. Most persons
on the land of others—licensees and trespassers—were not entitled
to “reasonable care” and enjoyed a much lower standard of care.9
Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that the law also imposed a low
standard with respect to protecting those not on the land from
hazards emanating from the land—such as falling trees. But the
clear nationwide trend in the law—initiated by the California
Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian,10 and now the majority
position—is to impose either a generalized standard of reasonable
care for landowners, or (at a minimum) require reasonable care for
both licensees and invitees.11
D. The Rights/Obligations Distinction
The traditional approach to “property” law in the United
States is that it gives the owners of property “rights” as to their
property as against the rest of the world—the quintessential
“bundle of sticks,” including such rights as the ability to use,
transfer, exclude, and destroy. In recent years, however, scholars
(and a few courts) have started to stress the obligations of property
owners.12 And the law obviously imposes some such
obligations—for example, pollution clean-up under CERCLA,
property taxes, substantial limitation of rights in deference to the
“public interest” without just compensation, etc. Some identify a
national paradigm shift away from the concept of property as
primarily a bundle of rights in favor of a more of balanced approach
that supplements the concept of rights with community-oriented,
stewardship, responsibilities and obligations. In that context, one
might think that it’s only a matter of time before either the courts

9. See, e.g., DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 591–608 (2000).
10. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1969).
11. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631
(1959) (“Through this semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and
with hesitation, towards imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty
of reasonable care in all the circumstances.”).
12. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 18 (2000); Alexander, The Social
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2000).
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or
perhaps
the
legislature
undo
the
traditional
“no-duty-for-falling-trees” doctrine.
The shift in all of these doctrines that undergirded the
traditional rule that a landowner has no liability for, or duty with
respect to, trees that fall from his land on to adjacent roadways
suggests that the time is now ripe to reconsider and replace the
ancient rule. As the Note observes, many jurisdictions have done
just that. Virginia has not.
II. Placing the Issue in the Constellation of Virginia Law
Having taught a number of law school classes at a
Virginia-based law school, my ineluctable conclusion is that
Virginia courts tend to move very slowly and conservatively. For
example, on the issue of landowner liability in tort for conditions
on their land,13 Virginia is one of the minority of states that still
hews to the traditional tri-partite rule that landowners owe a
reduced duty of care (or none at all) to persons injured on their
land.14
As noted above, in 2012, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed
in Dunlora the traditional rule that a landowner has no duty to
protect motorists on adjacent roads from falling trees on his land.
But even in this respect, Virginia extends protection to landowners
well beyond other states that retain the traditional rule. Other
states recognizing the traditional approach apply it as a
“no-duty-to-inspect” rule. The notion is that a landowner need not
undergo the expense of regularly checking to make sure that his
trees are not a danger to passing motorists. But these states
generally hold that “[i]f the landowner actually knows that a tree
has become a danger to those on the highway, he is obliged to use
reasonable care to deal with the risk. . . .”15 Not so in Virginia.
Dunlora suggests that even if a landowner knows full well that he
has a rotten tree that is likely to collapse on the road with the next

13. Supra Part II.C.
14. See RGR, LLC v. Settle, 764 S.E.2d 8, 33 (Va. 2014) (noting the desire to
limit the burden placed on a landowner regarding reasonable care given to
trespassers).
15. Dobbs, supra note 9, at 589.
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stiff wind gust, he has absolutely no tort duty to do anything about
it.16
And there are other areas in tort where Virginia law lags most
of the nation. For example, Virginia is one of only four states in the
nation that still totally precludes a contributorily-negligent
plaintiff from recovering even a dime in tort against a negligent
tortfeasor.17 Virginia is also one of a handful of states that still
applies the full-fledged traditional assumption of risk doctrine in
tort.18 Moreover, Virginia is one of the only states in the country
that still applies the concept of charitable immunity in tort.19 And
it’s not just tort law. In property law, Virginia is one of about only
fifteen states that still recognizes the old-fashioned tenancy by the
entirety (and also one of the still-smaller number of states
permitting that estate to fully insulate property from creditors of
just one spouse).20
Virginia is one of only eight states in the nation that still apply
the largely-defunct eighty-five-year-old First Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (note that the Second Restatement was completed
some 50 years ago, and the reporters are busily working on a
Third). Virginia thus employs the largely discredited notion of
so-called “vested rights.”21 This approach—inspired by “natural
law” thinking—was popular in the late nineteenth century and
16. Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 17–18 (Va. 2012).
17. Rascher v. Friend, 689 S.E.2d 661, 664–65 (Va. 2010).
18. Nelson v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 277, 280 (Va. 2003)
(“[T]he doctrine of assumption of risk that operates to bar recovery by an injured
party where the nature and extent of the risk were fully appreciated and
the risk was voluntarily incurred by that party. Assumption of risk is an
affirmative defense in Virginia.”) (internal citation omitted).
19. Ola v. YMCA of S. Hampton Roads, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Va. 2005)
(“The doctrine of charitable immunity ‘is firmly embedded in the law of this
Commonwealth and has become a part of the general public policy of the State.’”
(quoting Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes, 108 S.E.2d 388, 396 (Va. 1959))).
20. Evans v. Evans, 772 S.E.2d 576, 580 (Va. 2015) (“[C]onsistent with this
restriction on alienability, no creditor of only one spouse can attach property held
by both spouses as tenants by the entirety.”).
21. Holland v. Bd. of Supervisors, 441 S.E.2d 20, 21–22 (discussing whether
the plaintiff “identif[ied] a significant official governmental act that would permit
[him] to conduct a use on [his] property that otherwise would not have been
allowed” to prove he had a vested right); Vested-rights Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“identify a significant official governmental act that
would permit the landowner to conduct a use on its property that otherwise would
not have been allowed.”).
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early twentieth centuries, and was already beginning to fall out of
fashion in many jurisdictions by the time the First Restatement
went to print nearly a century ago. It has been abandoned by
virtually all other states for a good half century.
When it comes to procedure, Virginia is one of the only states
in the country that does not permit class actions. In addition, it
modernized its summary judgment rules to permit the use of
affidavits—something the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
permitted for more than seventy-five years—only a few years ago.
On the issue of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion), the
Commonwealth still applies the old-fashioned issue preclusion rule
that demands privity and rejects offensive, non-mutual use of
collateral estoppel. The United States Supreme Court rejected that
approach for federal law purposes in the Blonder Tongue22 case
nearly half a century ago and only a handful states still join
Virginia in applying the traditional approach.23
All this is not to say that Virginia’s positions on all these issues
are necessarily wrong—although good arguments could be made
that many of them are. Much could be said for the virtues of
awaiting legislative action before altering time-tested doctrines
and rules, even if the legislature—seemingly in deference to the
judiciary—shows no sign of action. But the larger point is that
Virginia moves quite slowly—even more so than most other
states—in changing long-established legal rules. So, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will revisit its decision to retain the
traditional no-liability-for-falling-trees-rule anytime soon. And
thus, the Note is right to look elsewhere for a potential duty to
make the roads safe from falling trees.
III. The Arguments for Imposing a Duty on Road Maintainers
My final remarks will focus on Mr. McElhaney’s proposed
solution to the above problems by taking up the hint in Dunlora
and
imposing
liability—not
on
landowners—but
on
“road-maintaining” entities (normally government). At the outset,
I note one minor disagreement with the argument in the Note. The
22. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
23. See id. at 349–50 (stating that mutuality estoppel is antiquated and no
longer relevant in American society).
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Note suggests that liability should be imposed upon the road
maintainers because Dunlora refused to impose liability upon
landowners, thus “leav[ing] the road-maintaining entity as the
only entity potentially liable for injuries resulting from treefalls in
the roadway.”24. This argument seems to put the cart before the
horse and assume that someone must be liable in tort to any
motorist injured by a falling tree. Of course, the other possibility is
that no one is liable to such injured motorists and that they will
have to bear the costs of their own injuries. Many injuries suffered
by persons in our society do not result in tort liability for anyone;
it’s simply a misnomer to imply that the mere fact of injury
demands a defendant somewhere who can pay.
More broadly, however, the Note’s arguments for imposing
liability upon road maintainers is strong. The Note urges that
observe how this deals with the two principal rationales for the
traditional approach of no-liability for landowners. First, this
approach neatly circumvents the no-duty rule. It’s plausible to
characterize the non-liability of a landowner (who is after all just
owning land but not engaging in a dangerous activity) as a function
of the no-duty-to rescue rule: he simply failed to “come to the
rescue” of motorists that endangered by rotting trees. But it’s not
plausible similarly to characterize the road-builder/road
maintainer as a non-actor that the law is trying to conscript to
come to the rescue. On the contrary, the road-maintainer is
undeniably involved in an activity—providing and maintaining
roads. Imposing a duty to inspect for dangerous trees is thus just
one way of insisting that one engaged in providing and
maintaining roads do so with reasonable care for the safety of
motorists. In this respect, demanding reasonable tree inspection is
no different in principle from demanding reasonable guardrails,
reasonable
pothole
repair,
reasonable
bridges,
and
reasonably-operating stoplights. As the Virginia Supreme Court
noted in Dunlora, “[t]he duty of the [public entity that maintains
the highway] is to perform a positive act in the preparation and
preservation of a sufficient traveled way.”25
In the same way, shifting liability to the state deals with the
second rationale for the traditional no-liability-for-falling-trees
24.
25.

McElhaney, supra note 2, at 549.
Dunlora, 726 S.E.2d at 18.
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rule—the distinction between natural and artificial conditions.
When we look at the road builder/maintainer, the issue is whether
the artificial condition—the road—is safe. The focus need not be on
the “natural” condition of a rotting tree. The “artificial condition”
of the roadway introduced into the natural environment imposes a
duty to guard against dangers to those on the roadway from falling
trees.
So taking up Dunlora’s suggestion of government liability and
running with it was an excellent idea. The problem is that—like
many good ideas—it introduced another potential Pandora’s Box
of problems, specifically this associated with governmental
immunity in tort. But I will not belabor those here, as Mr.
McElhaney has addressed them in his Note. Indeed, the morass of
Virginia governmental immunity law—resulting in widely varied
standards for state, county and municipal liability and
hard-to-reconcile decisions on the distinction between sovereign
and commercial activities—is due for a revamping of its own that
extends far beyond the falling-tree doctrine. We’ll leave that for
another day.

